My submission to the OCAER, October 2006.

Appendix IV: Just say no to PR by Party.

I have serious issues with Proportional Representation systems. Some of these have not been covered in the Assembly's 'education'.

Still, PR by Party seems to be very popular. This Assembly is facing the usual blunt force tactic of quantity over substance. It's 'everybody send an e-mail'.

There must be something to it. So I wonder why voters will like PR by Party.

Is it because the minimum length of an election campaign is not enough time for the voters to make an informed choice on too many things? Then make the campaign twice as long, more like it used to be. Trust the voters.

Is it because the MPPs and the parties need more time to decide what's really worth doing, and in a year or two, find a compromise that may take another two or three years to implement? That's what parties are there for, to find the answers on their own time. Respect the voters.

Is it because five partisan MPPs, each elected by 17% of the vote, are better qualified to vote on important things that affect everyone in their big District, than five little district MPPs, each elected by at least 30% of the vote like the old days of SMP? If the People are lucky enough to find one of these partisan guys that will represent them like the obligated SMP guy, it's still 4 against one and the People lose.

Is it because it's easier for good party soldiers to get elected? Well, yes, it's unlikely that a majority of people expecting honest and effective representation would vote for any of them. And still, they have to muddle the question

Is it because it's easier for partisan MPPs to be unaccountable to the voters? Yes, the invisible electorate is always on your side. 'Everybody' knows that.

Is it because there is a free lunch, and someone has to be King?

There are times when I feel that PR is one very hard sell.

But PR is what the parties want.



System features that a democracy does not need.

Like most electoral systems, PR uses a muddled question that includes representation with party policy selection. This is unfair to Independent candidates, and to voters who can tell the difference. The 'all-in-one-vote' idea for democracy belongs in organizations where there is little or no agenda. It works where 'everybody knows' that there will be a membership drive in the spring, fundraising in the fall, and an AGM in the winter.

Most PR Voting systems are based on percentages of voter turn-out. Success based on these percentages only encourages parties to lose the non-voters, and to badger unfriendly voters to the point that they may not vote too. PR systems aim to elect very partisan representatives. They intentionally orphan not only those whose choices fail to reach threshold, but also everyone who did not vote. This could easily be close to 50% of the electorate. Using the turnout in the calculation of threshold is giving the candidates and parties a good reason to leave these 'voters who don’t count' alone.

By design, STV forces small parties to look like losers with the system's vote-stealing problem. Small parties will run fewer candidates to avoid having all their candidates eliminated before they can reach the Quota. Strong individual candidates may consider encouraging their STV leftover percentages to help elect weaker opponents.

By design, MMP encourages small parties to leave most of the FPP District votes uncontested. It may be that it almost always takes 30% to win there. And big parties may use the opportunity to elect a small party's worst candidates. This will weaken the small party's competitiveness in parliament. For example, if the 'polls' indicate party 'G' will win 4 compensatory seats in a 100 seat parliament ... the big parties could choose to let the four worst 'G' party candidates run practically unopposed in districts. They may even encourage their own party supporters to vote for these acceptable 'G' party candidates.

Most MMP systems can deliver the same minorities with majorities that FPP does. For example: With 60% of MPPs elected in districts, and the remaining 40% through compensatory regional voting ... A district sweep by a 30% party would need to have Parliament double in size to make it 'right'. But parties in partisan systems never intend to landslide like that. It's not good for business.

STV cannot guarantee fair proportions by party. Aside from 'vote-stealing', star candidates are a problem. Voters may think they have done enough by choosing the best candidates for a party, and stop there. When one candidate gets 35% of a party's 40%, and the ballots get 'exhausted'. The voters get just one MPP in a district of 7 members, when the party and the voters expect to see three.

Preamble, A suggestion, Appendix I, Appendix II, Appendix III, and Appendix IV